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and portray them as subhuman with no knowledge of law or international law. Racism then
Africa: Mapping New Boundaries in International became, as Basil Davidson describes it, the moral
Law. Edited by Jeremy I. Levitt. Oxford, Port- justification and "the conscious and systematic
land OR: Hart Publishing, 2008. Pp. vii, 333. weapon ofdomination, ofexploitation, which first
Index. $70.
saw its demonic rise with the onset of the transAtlantic trade in African captives sold into slavery,
African history is often written as though the and which, later, led on to the imperialist colonialcontinent had no existence worth noting before ism of our yesterdays."' The erasure of Africans
its invasion by Europeans, suggesting that nothing from the creation, and use, of international law has
4
happened there during its "prehistory." This even been extended to African-Americans.
blotting out of early African history as well as its
Africa: Mapping New Boundaries in Internacontributions to human knowledge has been part tional Law, edited by Jeremy Levitt, an associate
of the willful dehumanization used to justify the dean and professor at Florida A&M University
continent's subsequent enslavement, coloniza- College of Law, seeks to explicitly counter the
tion, and exploitation. Moreover, international racist mythology that Africans were a tabula rasa
in international law. Through his own powerfully
law, construed as the project of European nations,
written introduction in the book, Levitt smashes
has played a role in this plunder.'
Perhaps in no other continent was the conquest the assumption that Africa was devoid of law, and
harsher than in Africa. Crawford Young has international law in particular. His opening sendescribed the ruthlessness of the "Scramble for tence proclaims that "Africa is a legal marketplace,
not a lawless basket case" (p. 1). The book comAfrica":
bines both Levitt's work and that of eight other
Africa, in the rhetorical metaphor of the renowned scholars, each of whom has written a
imperial jingoism, was a ripe melon awaitchapter on Africa's place in international law. Leving carving in the late nineteenth century.
itt argues, as do the other contributors to the book,
Those who scrambled the fastest won the
largest slices and the right to consume at their that Africa has always made-and continues to
leisure the sweet, succulent flesh. Stragglers make-international law.
Perhaps the question to ask is whether Africa
snatched only small servings or tasteless portions; Italians, for example, found only des- has been more of an object or a subject of internaserts on their plate.'
tional law. Ifthere is a weakness in Levitt's volume,
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To justify the plunder of the continent, it was
important for Europeans to racialixe Africans

3

' Antony Anghie, Franciscodie Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of InternationalLaw, 5 SOC. & LEGAL

BASIL DAVIDSON, AFRICAN CIVILIZATION
REVISITED: FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TiMES 3
(1991).
J. RICHARDSON III, THE ORIGINS OF
AFRICAN-AMRCAN INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL

STUD. 321 (1996).

LAW

2

Crawford Young, The Heritage of Colonialism, in
AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS 19 (John W. Harbeson
& Donald Rothchild eds., 199 1).
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'HNR

(2008), reviewed at 104 AJIL 313 (2010), by
Ruth Gordon. Richardson notes that Afican-Americans
have long utilized, and contributed to, international
law.
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this is the one issue not ftdlly addressed by the
authors. To what extent did the norms of international law developed by Africans- or with their
participation-find centrality in the system? Have
African states been able to defang international
law of its imperialist and exploitative biases against
the global South'? In other words, is international
law still just a handmaiden of the West?
As James Thuo, Gathii and other international
legal scholars have argued, modern international
law is normatively heavily Eurocentric and has
6
been deployed to impoverish the global South. s
Others have pointed out this Eurocentric focus
while trying to reconcile international law with
universality. 7 The point is that European predicates have largely shaped the current expression
ofinternational law used to dominate and colonize
the global South.' Mohammed Bedjaoui, the
famous judge of the International Court ofJustice,
has been clear on this point. 9
While the book is explicit on contemporaty
contributions of Africa to international law, it is
less clear about the continent's place in antiquity.
What precisely were Africa's contributions to
international law before its conquest? More specifically, what legal order or nomenclature governed 'relations between African states-and
between African states and states outside the continent-in earlier times? These are not idle questions given that African statehood predated the
Scramble for Africa and the imposition of the
10
modern Eurocentric state on Africa.
Th~rien, Beyond the North-South
5 enPiip
Divide: The Two Tales of World Poverty, 20 THIRD
WORLD Q 723-42 (1999).
'sJames Thuo Gathii, InternationalLaw and Eurocentricity, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 184 (1998) (book review).
7 SURyA PRAKASH SINHA, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996); SIBA
N'ZATIOULA

GROVOGUI,

SOVEREIGNS,

QUASI

SOVEREIGNS, AND AFRICANS: RACE AND SELFDETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996).
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Historically, international law has been made
largely by states-specific territorial political societies governed by central authorities."1 The
existence of states necessarily implies a corpus of
law to regulate interstate relations, and evidence
suggests that rules governed the relations between states. Traditional modern international
law, largely a "civilized" European creation,
claimed the right to determine which other entities qualified as "states."1 " Without such recognition, societies lacked sovereignty and were therefore liable to colonization by European "states"
that could decide which entities to admit into full
statehood.
The issue is whether so-called "states," as
defined by European standards, properly existed
in Africa and, if so, how Europeans justified their
colonial conquest of the continent. In terms of
international law, perhaps the most vivid example
of an African "state" is Ethiopia, one of the longest
continually enduring states in the world. France,
Britain, and Italy even recognized Ethiopian sovereignty between 1898 and 1907.13 Furthermore,
there can be no argument that states existed in
Africa long before colonization. Roland Oliver has
written that although "[niot all of the Africans
tried to found states," most "lived, apparently
from quite early in the Iron Age, in states, and
these states were invariably in some sense hereditary monarchies."1 " Some, such as the Soninke
Kingdom in West Africa, have been traced as far
back as the fourth centuty, as were the Tekrur and
Mandingo kingdoms in Senegal and Mali, respectively. Starting in the ninth century, recorded histoty of sophisticated states exists for ancient
Ghana, Mali, Songhai, Benin, among others. In
I The British, for example, regarded international
law as the province of "Christian nations." James Crawford, The Criteriafor Statehood in InternationalLaw,
1976-1977 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 93, 98 (citing 1 HERBERT ARTHUR SMITH, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE

' Antony An ghie, Findingthe Peripheries:Sovereignty LAW OF NATIONS 12 (1932)).
12~ U.0
UMOZURIKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERand Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International
NATIONAL LAW 9-10 (1993).
Law, 40 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 1 (1999).
13
9
ILAN BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARES: A
MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW
LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 775
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979).
(1979).
10 Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map ofAfrica:
14 ROAD OLIVER, THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
A MoralandLegalInquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113
(1995).

145 (1991).
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East Africa, precolonial states arose in present-day
Uganda, including Buganda, the most sophisticated of them, as well as Bunyoro, and Ankole.
Other states existed in present-day northern Tanzania among the Hehe and Nyamwezi peoples.
Other well-known states in the region were
Rwanda and Burundi. The Luba/Lunda and
Kongo states of Angola-Congo, the Mwanamupata kingdom in Zimbabwe, and the Swazi,
Tswana, Zulu, and Sotho states can be traced to
around the fifteenth century in central and southern Africa.'"
But what evidence exists that precolonial African states made international law? Historical
records show not only that precolonial African
states engaged in regulated interstate relations,
including commerce with states as far afield as the
Middle East, but also that diplomatic relations
existed between precolonial African states and
In the fourteenth century,
European cuti.
Mansa Musa, ruler of the Mandingo kingdom of
Mali, engaged in regular interstate commerce with
Arab states to the north.1 " In the sixteenth century,
the Oba (king) of Benin, the West African precolonial state, sent envoys to Portugal to procure
arms."8 Levitt's volume could have further extrapolated on these interstate relations and sought to
show how they contributed to the development of
a corpus of international law before the emergence
of modern international law.
Admittedly, these relations between Africa and
other states soured later as the trade in African captives by Europeans replaced any semblance of
diplomacy. The European conquest of Africans

served as the basis for the doctrine of white
supremacy in international law development. But,
as Basil Davidson describes, white supremacy was
at odds with previous European scholarship about
Africa:
European scholarship knew that the foundations of European civilization derived from
classical Greek civilization. That scholarship
further accepted what the Greeks had laid
down as patently obvious: that classical
Greek civilization derived, in its religion, its
philosophy, its mathematics and much else,
from the ancient civilizations ofAfrica, above
all from Egypt of the Pharaohs. To those
"founding fathers" in classical Greece, any
notion that Africans were inferior, morally
or intellectually, would have seemed merely
silly. '9
Thus, the notion that Africa was terranullius-a
no-man's historical and cultural wasteland ready
to be taken over by Europeans-is a figment of the
imagination of European illusionists, who had
ample reason to paintAfrica as "dark" and "prehistoric" even though they knew better. The historical record suggests the exact opposite-that Africa
contributed to human civilization, including,
most likely, the classical civilizations of the
West."0 No matter on which side one falls, the
debate reveals a need to revisit and reexamine
notions ofwhite supremacy in the construction of
global civilization. But Davidson is clear when discourses of white supremacy took hold:
The advocates of this discourse [white
supremacy and the African inferiority][George] Hegel most typically, but duly followed byahost of"justifiers"- declared that
Africa had no history prior to direct contact
with Europe. Therefore the Africans, having
made no history of their own, had clearly
made no development of their own. Therefore they were not properly human, and
could not be left to themselves, but must be

Id at 145-58; BASIL DAVIDSON,

AFRICA INHisTHEMES AND OUTLINES 141-83 (rev. ed.
1992) [hereinafier DAVIDSON, AFRICA IN HISTORY];
BASIL DAVIDSON, THE LOST CITIES OF AFRICA
(1987); CHEIKH ANTA DIOP, PRECOLONIAL BLACK
AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE POLITICAL
15

TORY:

AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND BLACK
AFRICA, FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE FORMATION OF
MODERN STATES (Harold Salemson trans., 1987); T.
OLAWALE ELIAS, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN
AFRICA 1-12 (1963).

Davidson, supra note 3, at 77-124.
ELIAS, supra note 15, at 6-15.
"IT. 0. ELIAS, AFRICA AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW I11n.25 (Richard Akinjide
ed., 1988).
16
17

[Vol. 104

9

1 DAVIDSON, AFRICA IN HISTORY, supra note 15,
at xxii-xxiii.
20
IIMARTIN BERNAL, BLACK ATHENA: THE
AFROAsLATIC ROOTS OF CLASSICAL CIVILIZATION
(Vol. 1 (1987), Vol. 11 (1991), Vol. 11I, (2006)). For a

critique of Bernal's thesis, see BLACK ATHENA REVISITED (Mary R. Lefkowitz & Guy MacLean Rogers eds.,
1996).
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"led" towards civilization by other peoples:
that is, by the peoples of Europe, especially of
western Europe, and most particularly of
2
Britain and France. 1

The European expansion into Africa-whether
by missionaries, merchants, or colonial administrators-was justified by theories of white supremacy. Africans were considered as a "pre-law"
people who were morally inferior and intellectually immature. For example, European missionaries, like Denys Shropshire, considered Africans
as a "primitive people," who did not have the "sovereignty of reason."12 ' Another opined that the
"mission" to Africa was the "least that we [Europeans] can do is to strive to raise him [the African]
in the scale of mankind."12 3 Seen from these
perspectives, the European conquest of Africa is
presented as a mission to "'save"~and "civilize" a
benighted people. Moreover, according to this
construction, ifAfricans lacked reason and cogent
political societies governed by law, they could not
have contributed to the development of human
civilization, particularly international law.
But, as noted, ample evidence proves the exact
opposite, establishing Africa's normative contributions to human civilization. As Levitt points out
in his introduction, an examination of Africa's
heritage right from the ancient and premedieval
periods yields a significant corpus of law. In a
sense, Africa never stopped contributing to the
development ofglobal culture. The book is a push21

DAVIDSON, AFRICA IN HISTORY, supranote 15,

at xxii.
22

DENYS W. T. SHROPSHIRE, THE CHURCH AND
PRIMITIVE PEOPLES: THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
AND BELIEFS OF THE SOUTHERN BANTU AND THEIR
BEARING ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE CHRISTIAN
MISSIONARY xix (1938). Many Europeans believed in

the innate inferiority of Africans. One European missionary wrote that "[t~he mere possession on the part of
the Bantu of nothing but an oral tradition of culture
creates a chasm between the Native 'mind' and that of
civilized man, and of itself would account for a lack of
balance and proportion in the triple psychological fuinction of feeling, thinkting and acting, implying that
thinking is the weakest ofthe three and that feeling is the
most dominant." Id
23

ALFRED HENRY BARROW, FIFTy YEARS IN
WESTERN AFRICA: BEING A RECORD OF THE WORK
OF THE WEST INDIAN CHURCH ON THE BANKS OF
THE RIO PONGO 29 (1900).
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back to those who would erase Africa from the
map of the intellect.
MappingNew Boundaries is most illuminating
when it focuses on Africa's contributions to contemporary international law. Each ofthe contributors takes a critical area of the law and shows how
Africa's ingenuity and struggles for a more just
world have added to the normative and conceptual
diversity of international law. In this regard, the
contributors amply demonstrate Africa's heartbeat in the body politic of the world. The foreword
by Adama Dieng, registrar of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), correctly
states that "Africa is confirming existing norms of
international law and spurring new ones" (p. viii)
and that "Africa has made the most progress in
generating rules, norms and doctrine to confront
its aching problems" (p. vii). It is here that Africa's
presence on the international-law-making scene is
most important. Africa must play a large role in
correcting the biases and distortions of international law that have historically been used against
it. But it cannot do so without producing countervailing norms that bring equity, justice, and equality to the table. Its ability to repeal bad law will
depend on its genius to produce better law. In
turn, such revisions ofinternational law are bound
to give Africa more legitimacy.
Similarly, Adrien Wing, in her chapter "Women's Rights and Africa's Evolving Landscape: The
Women's Protocol of the Banjul Charter," highlights what she calls "an important doctrinal
contribution" in the enactment by the African
regional human rights system of the Protocol to
the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa2"
(Women's Protocol) (p. 13). Even though women
often have a subordinate societal role in Africa,
African states have shown a crucial political and
intellectual commitment by adopting this pioneering instrument, the first regional document
devoted solely to women's rights. The Women's
24 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa,
July 11, 2003, OAU Doc. CABILEGI66.6 (entered
into force Nov. 25,2005) [hereinafter Women's Protocol], available at http://www.achpr.orglenglish/-info/

women-en.html.
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Protocol, which came into force in 2005, is the
first such document in international law to explicitly mention abortion 2 5 and the first to prohibit
harmful female genital surgeries.6
The Women's Protocol itself is a product of
another pioneering African human rights instrument, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which was adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1981.'7 The
African Charter-the anchor document for the
African human rights system-makes significant
doctrinal contributions to international human
rights law. One of the most significant is its codification of the so-called "three generations" of
rights-civil and political rights, known as "first
generation" rights; economic, social, and cultural
rights known as "second generation" rights; and
peoples' rights, such as the rights to the environment, peace, development, and self-determination,
known as "third generation" rights."8 The African
Charter is also the first human rights treaty to
impose duties on individuals as part of its theoretical rights framework. These innovative and
pioneering normative contributions on human
rights, as well as women's rights, demonstrate
beyond a shadow of a doubt that Africa is an
important player- conceptually and practicallyin the making of contemporary international law.
Apart from Wing, other authors in Mapping
New Boundaries write powerfully about Africa's
contributions to the areas of human rights and
humanitarian international law. Francis Dengspecial representative of the UN SecretaryGeneral for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass
Atrocities, former special representative of the
UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs), an esteemed intellectual, and a
Sudanese native-was solely responsible for the
development of new IDP standards. In his chapter, "Africa's Internally Displaced and the Development of International Norms: Standards versus
25

[Vol. 104

Implementation," Deng argues that the acceptance and implementation of norms by states are
not always a function of their legal status. In other
words, a text does not have to be a binding treaty
to achieve acceptance and implementation by
states (p. 65). Consequently, he did not opt for a
treaty but instead used "Guiding Principles" on
IDPs2 9 to disarm states reluctant to sign a new
treaty and to coax them to implement "new standards, although many norms in his Guiding Principles were already binding law from refugee and
international humanitarian law.30
These Guiding Principles have attained wide
acceptance by stares, civil society groups, and
intergovernmental organizations. The principles
not only restate existing legal obligations but also
develop new standards to fill gaping lacunae. Elsewhere in his well-researched chapter, Deng shows
how Africa has advanced international law. He
points to what this reviewer would call the jurisprudence of liberation from colonial rule to highlight Africa's role. For example, he underscores
Africa's role in solidifying the principles of selfdetermination, the inviolability of borders inherited from colonial rule, the notion of the "total
emancipation" of colonial and dependent territories, including apartheid South Africa, and the
grant of asylum to political refugees, a principle
that was enshrined in the OAU 1969 Refugee
3
Convention. '
In his own chapter, "Pro-democratic Intervention in Africa," Levitt shows that African states are
slowly turning away from the once ironclad position of noninterference in the internal affairs of
sister states (pp. 105- 07). Although this principle
was once unwavering among African states- especially during the era of the one-party despotic
states-there is recognition in Africa today that
one country's instability caused by authoritarian
rule could doom an entire region. The African
Union, which has replaced the defunct OAU, is

29 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,
Id., Art. 14.2(c).
Id., Art. 5.
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53lAdd.2 [hereinafter Guid27
Mfrian Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, ing Principles].
30 Makau Murua, Standara'Setting in Human Rights:
June 27, 198 1, OAU Doc. CABILEGI67I3 rev. 5, 21
Prognosis,29 HUM. RTS. Q. 547 (2007).
Critiqueand
Charter].
ILM 58 (1982) [hereinafter African
21 Makau waMurua, The BanjuliCharterandtheAfri"iOAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects
can CulturalFingerprint: An Evaluation ofthe Language of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001
INTS 45 (entered into force June 20, 1974).
ofDuties, 35 VA.J. INT'L. L. 339, 340 n.4 (1995).
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more willing to authorize interventions to restore
democratic governance or reverse military coups.
As Levitt points out, this development grows out
of the recognition that democracy is becoming an
entitlement in international law. Thus, African
interventions by the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and C6te d'Ivoire,
among others, vindicate this commitment. Similarly, African interventions have solved problems
32
in Lesotho and ended electoral disputes in Kenya.
Levitt notes that African states are developing
these norms of intervention because the international and UN systems have been ineffcctive
there in addressing humanitarian crises, state
instability, and armed conflicts.
Pacifique Manirakiza and Dino Kritsioris
weigh in separately on Africa's work on international criminal law and humanitarian warfare
respectively. In his chapter, "Customary African
Approaches to the Development of International
Criminal Law," Manirakiza focuses on how Africans resort to customary African approaches to
address war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide. Rwanda and its traditional gacacacourts
are presented as an alternative and more desirable
mechanism to deal with mass atrocities- despite
criticisms of these courts' stances on due process
and gender issues-because these courts seek to
resolve conflicts while maintaining cohesiveness
and social harmony. In contrast, international
criminal tribunals, such as the ICTR, are retributive
with little or no concern for social healing.
Manirakiza also offers the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission as another example of justice from below, as opposed to the
top-down approach of international criminal tribunals. Kritsiotis, in his chapter, "Humanitarian
Warfare: Towards an AfricanAppreciation," tabulates the many ways in which African states have
acted on issues of international humanitarian law,
including child soldiers, prosecutions and amnesties, and truth commissions.
Finally, MappingNew Boundarieslooks at governance and development. In "African Constitutionalism: Forging New Models for Multi-ethnic
32

MAKAUj MUTUA, KENYA'S QUEST FOR DEMOCRACY: TAMING LEVIATHAN 247 (2008).
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Governance and Self-determination," Peter Phamn
looks at the challenge of nationhood in Africa
given the artificiality of the Eurocentric-imposed
state. He argues that African states are finding
novel ways to build "nations" out of many
"sub-nations" or ethnicities. This challenge had
led to the collapse of some states. African constitutionalism has explored a wide range of options,
including autonomy regimes for ethnic groups,
accommodation of traditional authorities, and
even guarantees for cession, as is the case in south
Sudan. Elsewhere, states are also experimenting with typical liberal constitutions to create viable political societies. These experiments yield a
new frontier in constitution-making.
Joel Samuels, in his chapter "Redrawing the
Map: Lessons of Post-colonial Boundary Dispute
Resolution in Africa," focuses not on internalbut external-relations between African states on
the contentious issue of borders (p. 227). In spite
of the artificiality of African borders-and the
prevalence of internal conflicts within states-virtually no external conflicts have arisen between
African states because of border disputes (notwithstanding the recent armed conflicts between
Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as between Chad and
Libya). Remarkably, African states have routinely
submitted their border disputes to the International Court ofjustice and generally abided by its
opinions. In this respect, African states have
strengthened the ICJ's role as an arbiter between
states.
The last chapter by Maxwell Chibundu on
"NEPAD and the Rebirth of Development
Theory and Praxis" looks at a new way of thinking
by African leaders to solve African problems. The
New Partnership for African Development
(NEPAD) is a conceptual and institutional framework for leadership with accountability in which
African elites tackle corruption and institute good
governance toward a continental renaissance. This
partnership is an acknowledgment that African
leaders failed the continent and therefore need to
rake responsibility.
The book brings together old voices with new
and seeks to establish that Africa has been activeand oftentimes leading--in the making of international law. With this book, Levitt aims to
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debunk the myth that Africa is just a passive recip
ient of ideas. What he and the other contributors
have shown is that, indeed, Africa is participating
effectively at the table of international law and is
changing that regime to its benefit. As a result,
Mapping New Boundaries is a powerful installment
presenting a welcome and fresh view of Africa.

MAKAUMUTUA
University at Buffalo Law School

[Vol. 104

